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 The broadcast nature of wireless networks makes them susceptible to attacks 
by eavesdroppers than wired networks. Any untrusted node can eavesdrop on 
the medium, listen to transmissions and obtain sensitive information within 
the wireless network. In this paper, we propose a new mechanism which 
combines the advantages of two techniques namely iJam and OFDM phase 
encryption. Our modified mechanism makes iJam more bandwidth efficient 
by using Alamouti scheme to take advantage of the repetition inherent in its 
implementation. The adversary model is extended to the active adversary 
case, which has not been done in the original work of iJam and OFDM phase 
encryption. We propose, through a max min optimization model, a 
framework that maximizes the secrecy rate by means of a friendly jammer. 
We formulate a Zero-Sum game that captures the strategic decision making 
between the transmitter receiver pair and the adversary. We apply the 
fictitious play (FP) algorithm to reach the Nash equilibria (NE) of the game. 
Our simulation results show a significant improvement in terms of the ability 
of the eavesdropper to benefit from the received information over the 





OFDM phase encryption 
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Security in the physical layer has been investigated by many researchers, for example, in [1-8] and 
the references therein. Some reasons for the importance of the security at the physical layer are: 
 Spoofing the signal from the wireless communication link and then breaking its security, or jamming the 
signal 
 The encryption at the physical layer is faster than the other layers, and has the least effect on the system 
when changed or modified 
The main themes in the physical layer security can be drawn either from the perspective of 
information theory and error correcting codes like in [4], or from statistical signal processing, which is 
mostly followed in [5-7]. In [1, 2], the approach is more likely to be a third perspective which follows a 
signal processing method. However, there is no real distinction among these approaches because the 
eavesdropper can exploit the weakness in the communication link regardless of the approach used. As a 
result, building a secure communication link requires building blocks from all approaches, and this is what 
we are trying to accomplish in this work. Additionally, with the advances going on such as the Internet of 
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things, there is a need for light but secure communications protocols. Physical layer security protocols are 
light and depend only on the channel information which already has to be determined to establish a 
communication link.  
In [1], a protocol called iJam is proposed to be used for establishing a link to share the key. The idea 
of iJam is to purposely jam the transmitted signal, received signal, or both at some desired locations. 
Jamming the transmitted signal is done in the case where the adversary, who is assumed to be passive, is 
capable of extracting the signal that is jammed by the receiver only. Jamming by the receiver only is the main 
idea of iJam. This is because, in the ideal case, the jamming is done by the receiver only at specific locations, 
after which the transmitter sends another copy of the same signal and the receiver jams this copy again at 
other locations. After jamming the two transmissions of the same signal in some specific locations, the 






Figure 1. iJam at work: the sender repeats its transmission; the receiver-cum-jammer randomly jams 
complimentary samples in the original signal and its repetition; to decode, the receiver-cum-jammer, stitches 
together un-jammed samples to create a clean symbol [1] 
 
 
However, the simple case of iJam is location dependent. Meaning that the adversary can set up a 
statistical test, as derived in [1], to see which samples from the signal are jammed and which are not by 
measuring their variance. This testing strategy is explained as follows [1]: 
 
𝑃𝑟(𝐻0|𝐶0, 𝐶1, 𝐶) ≥ 𝑃𝑟(𝐻1|𝐶0, 𝐶1, 𝐶) 𝑖𝑓  𝐻0 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒          
𝑃𝑟(𝐻0|𝐶0, 𝐶1, 𝐶)  <  𝑃𝑟(𝐻1|𝐶0, 𝐶1, 𝐶) 𝑖𝑓  𝐻1 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒        
(1) 
 
where C0 denotes the first OFDM sample received by the eavesdropper, C1 denotes the second, H0 denotes 
the hypothesis that C0 is jammed, H1 denotes the hypothesis that C1 is jammed and C is the condition that one 
of C0 and C1 is jammed. Substituting probabilities of H0 and H1 under the Gaussian probabilities and 








This happens when the jammer is either too close or too far from the receiver. A remedy for this is 
proposed by a slightly complicated and time inefficient mechanism which is basically built by jamming the 
signal at the transmitter and at the receiver. This is done with a lot of repetitions. The details are shown in [1]. 
On the other hand, the authors in [2], proposed that the encryption can be done based on an OFDM property 
of being sensitive to phase noise. It is well known that there are two main problems in OFDM, phase noise 
and peak to average power ratio “PAPR”. The phase noise causes the loss of the orthogonally among the 
subcarriers. The PAPR results from non-linearity of the amplifier which is because each OFDM time symbol 
is a linear combination of other frequency domain symbols and sometimes this sum is outside of the linear 
operation region of the amplifier which results in the signal being clipped. The basic block diagram for 
OFDM modulator is shown in Figure 2. In the receiver side, the reverse modulation operation takes place. In 
the classical encryption schemes, ciphering is done before the symbol mapping stage. The new approach 
followed in [2] is to do the ciphering after the IFFT stage at the transmitter and before it at the receiver. 
Figure 3 shows the encryption process. The decryption is done in reverse. 
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Figure 3. OFDM Encryption [2] 
 
 
Equations (3), (4), (5) and (6) describe the classical and the encrypted OFDM symbols. For (3) and (4), the 
frequency domain symbols 𝑀 = (𝑀0. . . 𝑀𝑁−1) ∈  𝐶
𝑁 are modulated symbols to be transmitted. The number 
of values 𝑀𝑘 can take is 2
r, where r is number of bits per symbol and it will depend on the underlying 
modulation scheme. i.e., r = 2 for QPSK and r = 4 for 16-QAM. Their corresponding baseband time domain 
OFDM symbol 𝑚 = (𝑚0 … 𝑚𝑁−1)obtained by performing inverse discrete Fourier transform (IDFT) on 𝑀 as 
 





𝑘=0 , {𝑖, 𝑘} ∈ {0,1, . . . , 𝑁 − 1} (3) 
 
 
In general, 𝑚𝑖 is complex valued. By simply applying the discrete Fourier transform (DFT), correct 
modulated symbols can be recovered as  
 





𝑖=0 , {𝑖, 𝑘} ∈ {0,1, . . . , 𝑁 − 1}  (4)
  
 
The encryption process that is described in [2] uses two pseudo-random sequences acting on the 
real, 𝑎𝑖 , and imaginary, 𝑏𝑖, parts of time domain data symbols mi from (3). The process is described by the 
following equation 
 
𝑐𝑖  =  𝑅𝑒{𝑚𝑖} × 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑗 𝐼𝑚{𝑚𝑖} × 𝑏𝑖 (5) 
 
It has to be mentioned that choosing OFDM in [1, 2] to do the iJam and the phase encryption over 
other signaling schemes such as BPSK is due to the nature of the OFDM signal. An OFDM symbol is a 
summation of N- random variables, where N is the size of FFT/DFT which is usually > 64. According to the 
central limit theorem, this summation is a Gaussian random variable so in the case of adding the noise in the 
iJam in the correct locations, the adversary will not be able to reconstruct the signal, because the signal has a 
Gaussian nature. However, this cannot be achieved with BPSK for example. In BPSK, as shown in [1], the 
adversary can recover most of the jammed symbols. 
 
 
2. PROBLEMS WITH iJam AND OFDM PHASE ENCRYPTION 
In this section we briefly review the drawbacks for the originally proposed iJam [1] and OFDM 
phase encryption [2]. These techniques are simple and powerful, but they have some problems that can be 
exploited by the adversary. 
 
2.1. Problems with iJam 
One of the problems with iJam is the location dependence, meaning that the adversary can change 
its location to gain a clean, unjammed, version of the transmitted signal. To solve this issue, the authors in [1] 
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proposed a protocol involving joint jamming between the transmitter and the receiver. However, even with 
the solution proposed in [1], iJam still depends on the location of the adversary. Another point mentioned in 
[1] is that OFDM has to have a cyclic prefix “CP” which usually consists of a part of the symbol re-appended 
to its end for the sake of combating the inter-symbol interference. The CP represents exposed information. In 
[1], the author proposed jamming the CP too, but since the CP requires the first or the last 25% of the symbol 
to be re-appended, iJam has to always jam the same portion of the OFDM symbol corresponding to the CP. 
As a result, the adversary can deduce the jammed or unjammed locations by looking to the CP. This is in 
addition to the assumption that the adversary is passive, which is used in both proposals [1, 2]. 
 
2.2. Problems with OFDM phase encryption 
The authors in [2] have shown that their algorithms break under known plaintext attack, which is 
expected because the encryption is a one-time pad cipher [8]. Another problem is that they are assuming that 
the transmitter and the receiver know the values of the encryption keys. In this work, we tackle only the first 
problem. The second problem of the key-sharing is not in the scope of this paper. 
 
 
3. THE PROPOSED PHYSICAL LAYER ENCRYPTION SYSTEM 
In this part we explain two mechanisms to deal with the adversary that can be active or passive. In 
this first part, we explain how to deal with a passive adversary. In the second part, we assume an active 
adversary that can have more abilities to avoid the iJam protocol, the OFDM phase encryption, or both 
through modeling the problem as a max min optimization problem that is a Zero-sum game model. 
 
3.1. The proposed scheme for a passive adversary 
By combing both the OFDM phase encryption and the simplest form of iJam (where the receiver 
only jams the received signal), we can build a more secure link. This can be done either directly or with 
enhanced spectral efficiency. However, there still a possibility of an attack which occurs when the iJam noise 
is not high enough to distort the symbols and there is a known plain text. Although the feasibility of such an 
attack is low, our proposed scheme is still stronger than both protocols individually, and simpler than the 
iJam alone. 
 
3.1.1. Direct combining 
OFDM phase encryption method does not suffer from the location dependency problem like the 
iJam method, the adversary will not be able to deduce which symbols were jammed by constructing the 
statistical test above. The adversary can only detect symbols that are jammed by receiver and these symbols 
are already encrypted. The drawback of this method is the loss of bandwidth, because the signal has to be 





Figure 4. Baseband phase encrypted OFDM transceiver 
 
 
3.1.2. The bandwidth efficient combining scheme 
iJam scheme requires the original signal and its copy to perform the jamming and the stitching at the 
receiver. Meaning that for two transmission periods, the transmitter sends the same signal. This lowers the 
efficiency of the system by half. A simple solution is to use a system with multiple antennas or any other 
spatial multiplexing method. In this paper, we use the simplest method to do this is which is the Alamouti 
transmission scheme [9]. Simply put, the Alamouti scheme is a method of processing the transmitted signal 
such that it is easy for the receiver to build a set of simultaneous equations and solve them to extract the 
original transmitted signal. To illustrate this concept, we will consider the case of two transmitting antennas 
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and one receiving antenna. Furthermore, even the case of two transmitting antennas and two receiving 
antennas can be converted to the above case by turning one of the antennas off at the reception to lower the 
operating cost (for example to reduce the power). The proposed transceiver block diagram is shown in  
Figure 5. At the first time instant, the first symbol is transmitted from Antenna 1, and the conjugate of the 
second symbol is transmitted from Antenna 2. At the second time instant, the second symbol is transmitted 
from Antenna 1, and the negative conjugate of the first symbol is transmitted from Antenna 2. The purpose of 
the conjugations and negations is to make the detection easier at the receiver. Specifically, this formulation 
provides an algorithm to build a system of two simultaneous equations with two variables. The details of 
transmission and detection can be found in [9] and are out of the scope of this work. At the receiving side, the 






Figure 5. The new two-branch transmit diversity Alamouti scheme with two transmit antennas 
 
 
3.2.  The proposed scheme for an active adversary 
The above schemes are designed for the case of a passive adversary that is only able to receive the 
signal and to perform calculations on it. As a result, if the signal is encrypted, it should be difficult for the 
adversary to extract something useful from it. However, the adversary can be active and act strategically. One 
possibility is that the adversary can change its location to get a cleaner version of the transmitted signal 
exploiting the receiver limited jamming power ability, since the power is always a resource that has to be 
used efficiently. For the sake of clarity, the active adversary scenario is shown in Figure 6. The desired 
signals from the transmitter to the receiver are plotted in solid lines and the channels are marked as {ℎ𝑟𝑡},
𝑎𝑛𝑑 {𝑟, 𝑡} ∈ {1,2} where 𝑟 means the receiving antenna and 𝑡 means the transmitting antenna. The jamming 
signal and the eavesdropped signal are denoted by differently dotted lines. The channels 𝑔1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑔2 are the 
eavesdropped signals channel coefficients between the transmitter and the adversary, while 𝑔3 is the channel 
coefficient between the friendly jammer and the adversary. Finally, 𝑔4 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑔5 are the channel coefficients 
between the friendly jammer and the receiver. Note that we assume the adversary and the jammer have only 
one antenna for simplicity. This assumption is valid because the nature of the space time receiving algorithm 
that collects the signal from different channels and combines them. The adversary intention of getting a 
cleaner version of the transmitted signal can be for many reasons, such as storing the encrypted message to 
process it later by more advanced decryption tools or if the adversary has compromised some of the phase 
encryption keys. In this case the adversary is active by making moves to avoid the jamming from the 
receiver. This situation can still be handled by the concept of using, hiring, a friendly jammer which is an 
entity used by the transmitter and the receiver, interchangeably called Tx-Rx pair, to establish a secure 
communication link by jamming the transmitted signal. In this case, the signal will be jammed at the intended 
receiver as well as the adversary. The adversary will not be able to benefit from the eavesdropped 
information even if we consider the case of compromised phase encryption keys. However, this scenario is 
proposed for sensitive information transmission and it depends on the transmitter-receiver pair to judge if 
such technique is needed or not. On the other hand, the adversary can try to fool the transmitter to force it to 
jam the signal which leads to disrupting the communication link and no one will get useful information. This 
strategic interaction between the Tx-Rx pair and the adversary can be modeled using game theoretic models 
and in particular Zero-sum games. A game 𝐺 is defined by a set of players 𝑁, a set of strategies that players 
use 𝑆, and a set of the players’ payoffs or payoff (utility) functions 𝑈, and expressed as 𝐺(𝑁, 𝑆, 𝑈). In this 
paper, 𝑁 = {𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑟𝑦, 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟 − 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑟} = {𝐸, 𝑇𝑥}. The strategy set for the adversary is 
𝑆𝐴 = {𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝐷𝑜 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛} = {𝑠1, 𝑠2}. Each strategy is chosen with a probability, 
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or has some preference, {𝑦1, 𝑦2} ∈  𝒴 ∈ [0,1]. The strategy set for the Transmitter-Receiver pair is 𝑆𝑇𝑥 =
{𝐻𝑖𝑟𝑒 𝑎 𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑦 𝐽𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟, 𝐷𝑜 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝐻𝑖𝑟𝑒 𝑎 𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑦 𝐽𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟} = {𝐻 − 𝑂𝑛, 𝐻 − 𝑂𝑓𝑓}, and each strategy is 
chosen with a probability, or has some preference, {𝑧1, 𝑧2} ∈  𝒵 ∈ [0,1]. In this paper, the Zero-sum game 
formulation is justified, because the adversary wants to cause as much damage as possible to the transmitter. 
This damage can be by eavesdropping the signal to cryptanalysis it, maybe later, or it can damage the 
transmitter-receiver pair by fooling them to, unnecessarily, use a friendly jammer that adds noise to the signal 
and degrades the signal quality at the receiver. This is a good strategy to use if the adversary does not have 
the abilities to cryptanalysis the signal. As a result, we can assume that the payoffs of the adversary are the 
losses of the transmitter-receiver pair and vice versa. It is also possible to reformulate this scenario as a non-
Zero-sum game by adding penalties to both parties, such as some penalty if the adversary changes its location 
or giving the adversary only a possible set of locations to move to with each of these locations has its own 





Figure 6. The active adversary scenario with the friendly jammer 
 
 
However, although this may be an interesting to investigate in details, we abstain from doing it in 
this paper for the following reasons: i) All non-Zero-sum games can be transformed to Zero-sum games by 
using appropriate transformations that preserves the game solution which is the Nash equilibria, NE [10], ii) 
Such analysis needs space and may destruct the reader from the main contributions in this paper, which are 
the introducing of a lightweight physical layer crypto system and analyzing some of the challenges that face 
it using different mathematical and simulation tools. However, the extension to the non-Zero-sum games can 
be tackled in future works. We consider for the payoff function the benefits captured by the secrecy rate 𝑅𝑠, 
as given in [4], and the cost of using the friendly jammer that is assumed to be a function of the jamming 
power, i.e., 𝑓(𝑃𝐽). The jamming cost 𝑓(𝑃𝐽) can be a linear or any other monotically increasing function of the 
jamming power to reflect the fact that hiring a friendly jammer when it is not necessary creates some penalty 
and this can be a goal to be achieved by the adversary to disturb the communication link. The jamming power 
is also present in the secrecy rate function. In particular, the transmitter wants to maximize 𝑈, while the 
eavesdropper tries to minimize it. The utility function is defined as 
 
 𝑈 = 𝑅𝑠 − 𝑓(𝑃𝐽) (6) 
 
The secrecy capacity is defined as [4] 
 
𝑅𝑠 =  (𝐶𝑅𝑋 (
ℎ𝑃
𝑔45𝑃𝐽+𝜎𝑅𝑥








where (𝑄)+ = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{0, 𝑄} and the channel rate 𝐶𝑂 (
𝑄
𝑅
) = 𝑙𝑛 (1 +
𝑄
𝑅
) , 𝑂 = {𝑅𝑋, 𝐸}, 𝑃 is the transmitted 
information power, ℎ =  ∑ |ℎ𝑖𝑗|
22
𝑖,𝑗=1 , 𝑔45  = |𝑔4|
2 + |𝑔5|
2, 𝑔12  = |𝑔1|
2 + |𝑔2|
2, 𝜎𝑅𝑥
2  is the AWGN power 
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at the receiver, 𝜎𝐸
2 is the AWGN power at the adversary, and 𝑥 ∈ [0,1] is the portion of the compromised 
keys. Assume there is a way to avoid the reply attack by placing some sort of ordering that is protected, so as 
to cancel this attack. Jamming the signal by adding noise to it can be achieved by making the transmitter 
believe that the adversary has some compromised keys which leads to added noise that is unknown to the 
receiver, this attack can successfully degrade the signal quality and increase the bit error rate, “BER”, of the 
received signal and lower the link capacity. Next, we express the game in the normal form shown in Table 1. 
The row player E gets a payoff 𝑎1, to be explained later, if uses strategy 𝑠1 against the column player Tx the 
employs a helper jammer strategy 𝐻 − 𝑂𝑛, and so on. The table entries 𝑎𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈  {1,2,3,4} are derived from 
(6) and (7) as shown below in (8) - (11).  
 
𝑎1 = − ((𝐶𝑅𝑋 (
ℎ𝑃
𝑔45𝑃𝐽+𝜎𝑅𝑥






− 𝑓(𝑃𝐽)), (8) 
 
𝑎2 = − (𝐶𝑅𝑋 (
ℎ𝑃
𝜎𝑅𝑥





,  (9) 
 
𝑎3 = − (𝐶𝑅𝑋 (
ℎ𝑃
𝑔45𝑃𝐽+𝜎𝑅𝑥
2 ) − 𝑓(𝑃𝐽)),  (10) 
 
𝑎4 = −𝐶𝑅𝑋 (
ℎ𝑃
𝜎𝑅𝑥
2 )  (11) 
 
 
Table 1. The normal form of the proposed Zero-sum game 
                        Tx 
   E 
𝐻 − 𝑂𝑛 
𝑤. 𝑝. 𝑧1 
𝐻 − 𝑂𝑓𝑓 
𝑤. 𝑝. 𝑧2 
𝑠1 
 𝑤. 𝑝. 𝑦1 
𝑎1, −𝑎1 𝑎2, −𝑎2 
𝑠2 
 𝑤. 𝑝. 𝑦2 
𝑎3, −𝑎3 𝑎4, −𝑎4 
 
 
The pure strategy, is a strategy chosen with probability 1 or a pure NE, but it is not always 
guaranteed to exist. However, all games have a solution in the mixed strategies which is mixed saddle point 
NE or mixed NE for simplicity. Meaning that each strategy is chosen with a certain probability. One way to 
find the NE of the game is to formulate an optimization problem for each player. In particular the NE can be 







Define the value of the game as 𝛾 = 𝑦𝑇𝐴𝑧, where 𝒚𝑻 = [𝑦1, 𝑦2], 𝒛 = [𝑧1, 𝑧2]
𝑇. The adversary wants 
to minimize 𝛾 over its set of strategies while the transmitter tries to maximize 𝛾 over its set of strategies. 
Meaning that they want to solve the following 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑎𝑥 optimization problem, 
 
For the adversary:  𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑦∈𝒴 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑧∈𝒵 𝑦
𝑇𝐴𝑧, (13) 
 
while for the transmitter: 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑧∈𝒵 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑦∈𝒴 𝑦
𝑇𝐴𝑧. (14) 
 
As mentioned above these equations can be formulated as linear programs which can be efficiently 
solved using many software packages [11]. 
 
𝐿𝑃1: 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑚  𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝛾 (15) 
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜: 𝑦 ≥ 0
                     1𝑦 = 1
                         𝐴𝑇𝑦 ≤ 𝛾1
  
 
Int J Elec & Comp Eng  ISSN: 2088-8708  
 
An enhanced OFDM light weight physical layer encryption scheme (Ahmed A. Alabdel Abass) 
2185 
𝐿𝑃2: 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑚   𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝛾 (16) 
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜: 𝑧 ≥ 0
                     1𝑧 = 1
                         𝐴𝑧 ≥ 𝛾1,
  
 
where 1 = [1,1] in (15) and (16).  
  The players can solve this game and reach the NE by using a learning algorithm without the need to 
a specialized solver. One such algorithm that is proved to converge to the NE is the fictitious play (FP) [12]. 
In FP, each player makes independent, fictitious assumptions, about the other player choices and updates 
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1, 𝑖𝑓 𝐼1 ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑠 




(𝑘)(𝑠𝑙 , 𝒮) = max𝒔∈𝑺 𝑢𝑖(𝑠𝑙 , 𝝆−𝒊(𝑘 − 1)) .   
 
Equation (17) means that at the kth iteration, the ithplayer chooses the strategy sl that maximizes her 
payoff and this assigns a value of 1 to 𝜈(sl) and 0for the other strategies. When substituting in (17), the 
strategy with 𝜈(sl) = 1 gets higher probability of being chosen in the next iteration, since 𝜈i
(k) − 𝜌i
(k) ≥ 0 , 
while other strategies with  𝜈(. ) = 0  get 𝜈i
(k) − 𝜌i
(k) < 0which reduces their chances of being chosen in the 
next iteration. It can be seen from (16) and (17) that FP learning algorithm depends on the local information 
in that each player has and there is no need to coordinate between players to exchange information which 
applies to the scenario in this paper where the transmitter cannot exchange information with the adversary. 
 
3.3.  Security analysis 
In this section we discuss some common attacks against the proposed physical layer encryption 
scheme for the case of passive adversary. The passive adversary is the general case, because the aim of the 
friendly jammer is to turn the active adversary to a passive. 
 
3.3.1. Statistical attack 
It is shown in [1] that iJam by itself can be deciphered by statistical attacks because it is a location 
dependent. However, by adding the phase noise, the attacker sees only almost AWGN noise. The immunity 
of the phased encrypted OFDM is shown in [2]. 
 
3.3.2. Compromised keys attack 
In [2], it is shown that the phase encrypted OFDM system experiences some problems with this type 
of attack. However, by introducing iJam, this type of attack is weakened due to the ability of iJam to reduce 
the leaked signal quality through jamming. 
 
3.3.3. Other attacks 
The weakness in both protocols arises for lower modulation schemes like BPSK. However, the 
proposed scheme in this work lowers the probability of this type of attack. From a theoretical point of view 
[8], there is no easy way to deduce the relation between the message and its ciphered version because the 
proposed scheme adds noise to both the phase and the magnitude of the message. By doing this, each symbol 
has equal probability of occurrence, and this is desirable from a security point of view. Another problem is 
the initial keys distribution, and one way to solve it is to assume that these keys are distributed through a 
secure channel or embedding them at the modulator and the demodulator at the installation.  
 
 
4. SIMULATION RESULTS  
The simulation is divided into two parts. The first part, Figures 7, 8 and 9, deals with a passive 
adversary, while the second part, deals with an active adversary. We use the following parameters to perform 
our simulations: OFDM FFT sizes 64 and 256, the modulation types BPSK, QPSK, and 16 PSK, the additive 
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white Gaussian noise (jammer noise) with zero mean and variances 0.1, 0.5 and 1 generated according to the 
procedure described in [13, 14] compromised keys, and MATLAB 2016. In the first part, in Figures 7-9, 
there are three curves in each figure. The first one entitled Ideal Case represents the case where there are no 
compromised keys. The second one entitled Compromised + iJam Case represents the case of twenty 
compromised phase encryption keys of the proposed system that combines iJam with phase encryption. The 
third curve entitled Compromised Case represents the case of using only phase encryption with twenty 
compromised keys. There is an improvement achieved by using a combination of iJam and OFDM phase 
encryption for the case of compromised keys. The first observation from Figures 7-9 is a noticeable 
improvement in the case of lower modulation schemes, BPSK and QPSK, even when there are compromised 
keys. In the case of 16 PSK, there isn’t much improvement. This is because 16 PSK is more susceptible to 
noise than BPSK and QPSK. The amount of the AWGN noise plays a vital role in increasing the security of 
the communication link which motivates the need of the friendly jammer. It is also because the ratio of the 
compromised keys is less. 
The second part of the simulation is shown in Figure 10, where it shows an example of the 
convergence to the NE using the FP algorithm and the payoff for each player. It can be seen that the 
adversary is better to use the first strategy which is to change its location to eavesdrop the communication 
between the Tx-Rx pair although the Tx-Rx pair is using a friendly jammer. This is only an example to the 
convergence to the NE which happens in this case to be a pure NE that is {𝑠1, 𝐻 − 𝑂𝑛}. It should be 
mentioned that the players are started from some initial points or beliefs and then updated their strategies. 
The NE can change depending on the players’ beliefs or preferences that are assigned to their strategies. The 
final observation is the amount of payoff that each player is getting in Figure 10-b and Figure 10-c which is 









Figure 7. The BER for the following parameters 7a - 𝜎2 = 0.1, FFT 256, QPSK, 7b - 𝜎2 = 0.1, FFT 256, 
BPSK, and 7c - 𝜎2 = 0.1, FFT 256, 16PSK 
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Figure 8. The BER for the following parameters; (a) – 𝜎2 = 0.5, FFT 256, QPSK, (b) - 𝜎2 = 0.5, FFT 256, 








Figure 9. The BER for the following parameters; (a) – 𝜎2 = 1, FFT 256, QPSK, (b) 𝜎2 = 1, FFT 256, BPSK, 
and (c) - 𝜎2 = 1, FFT 256, 16PSK 
                ISSN: 2088-8708 











Figure 10. The results of the game theoretic modeling where, (a) Strategies evolution, (b) The Tx-Rx pair 
payoff, (c) The adversary payoff 
 
 
5. RELATED WORK 
This section is intended to give a glimpse of the related work in the literature to our work. It is not 
meant to be comprehensive by any means. The work on iJam is proposed in [1]. The OFDM phase noise is 
based in the work in [2]. The work in physical layer security based on signal processing methods is a growing 
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and mature research area, for example [4-9] and [15] for a comprehensive exposure to the material. In [4-9] 
different signal processing algorithms are presented to maximize the secrecy rate at the physical layer. Along 
the same line, but with a different objective is the work on secret communications, for example [16]. In secret 
communications, the transmitter-receiver pair wants to hide the communication activity from the adversary 
which we believe that our work can be modified to achieve this objective too. On the other hand, game 
theoretic models have been used extensively to address security related problems [17]. Noncooperative 
games, for example, are used to model the jammer-user interaction through choosing the optimal 
transmission power level as in [18-20]. Another type of game models, namely evolutionary games are used to 
model the cooperation among selfish users to combat jamming attacks [21-22]. Combating active jammers, 
or smart jammers, is addressed by Stackelberg games in [23-25], where the transmitter-receiver pair hire a 
friendly jammer and set a price for jamming. A cooperative jamming game model under uncertainty is 
proposed in [14]. Finally, Zero-sum games are used extensively to model the transmitter-jammer behavior 
under mutual information as a metric, for example [26]. A closed form expression for a Zero-sum jamming 
game is given in [27].  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
Wireless networks are more susceptible to attacks by eavesdroppers than wired networks where any 
compromised node can eavesdrop on the medium, listen to transmissions and obtain sensitive information 
within the wireless network. In this paper, we proposed a technique to prevent an eavesdropper from gaining 
any secure information from the system. We proposed a new modified mechanism that combines the 
advantages of two techniques namely iJam and OFDM phase encryption. Our modified mechanism made the 
iJam more bandwidth efficient by using Alamouti scheme to take advantage of the repetition inherent in its 
implementation. We extended the adversary model here to the active adversary case, which has not been 
done in the original work of iJam and OFDM phase encryption. We proposed, through a max min 
optimization model, a framework that maximizes the secrecy rate by means of a friendly jammer. We 
formulated a Zero-sum game that captured the strategic decision making between the transmitter receiver pair 
and the adversary. We apply the FP learning algorithm to reach the NE. Our simulation results showed a 
significant improvement in terms of the ability of the eavesdropper to benefit from the received information 
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